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The Emergence of Nationalism
under Gorbachev
Changes in the political structure of the former Soviet Union led to its demise.
by Allegra Wechsler
Why did nationalism emergein the Soviet Union underGorbachev? At first glancethe answer seems decep-
tively simple: nationalism emerged
because of policies like Glasnost and per-
estroika. The republics had always had a
nationalist sentiment, but the Soviets had
repressed this feeling, and once restric-
tions on free speech abated, nationalism
simply burst forth. This hypothesis,
sometimes called the "sleeping beauty"
theory, is not satisfactory, however,
because it does not explain why some
areas were more nationalistic than oth-
ers. Most importantly, though, the theo-
ry paints too simple a picture of the
event and does not address other factors
that played a key role.
To start at the very beginning,
nationalism must be defined along with
its basic characteristics. The Collins
English Dictionary says that it is "a senti-
ment based on common cultural charac-
teristics that bind a population and often
produces a policy of national indepen-
dence or separatism." Gellner adds that,
in such a case, ethnic boundaries should
not cut across political ones. (Gellner 2)
What are these vaguely men-
tioned characteristics to which the
Collins dictionary refers? People desire
their own land where they can speak
their own language, practise their own
religion, control their own economy, pro-
tect their own environment, make their
own rules, and surround themselves
with their own culture.
All ethnic groups, however, do
not have these nationalistic desires. If
some ethnic communities can live togeth-
er peacefully and happily, why does
nationalism occur? This is not a simple
question, but it is central to understand-
ing why nationalism developed under
Gorbachev. There are a number of rea-
sons why nationalism emerges, and
many, but not all of these different pre-
conditions must be present in order to
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ignite the feelings of a group. First of all,
a people need a religion; a common lan-
guage, spoken and written; an area they
claim as their homeland that preferably
has historical and cultural significance;
an ethnic elite who can lead the people,
and an intelligetsia who can organize the
movement. (Smith 48) These conditions,
though, are not enough, since many
groups have them but are not nationalis-
tic. In addition, a people need to become
conscious of themselves as a group.
(Smith 50) This sometimes occurs when
an ethnie are repressed or when there is
a power vacuum or some other type of
uncertainty that brings the people's
physical and economic security into
question.
If all ethnies are not nationalis-
tic, is nationalism then natural? Gellner
and Snyder, two authorities in this field,
believe that the movement is natural
because of the pressures of the modern
era. In today's world, only nation-states
function on the world stage. (Snyder 11)
Moreover, industrialization creates a
need for a nation-state because a modern
economy demands a high culture and an
educated workforce where all people
speak the same language. (Gellner 40)
Only nationalism can provide these pre-
requisites to affluence which all people
and states desire.
If nationalism is natural for
developed or developing countries, then
it ought to have occured in the republics.
It is therefore important to mention that
this sentiment did exist before the Soviet
takeover, especially in the Ukraine,
Armenia, and Georgia, and it provided
important roots for its later emergence
under Corbachev and his predecessors.
If nationalism did exist in a
number of places, why did it not emerge
before Gorbachev came to power? The
"sleeping beauty" theory claims that it
would have developed earlier and that
only forced repression restrained it.
This, however, is not true. As explained
above, nationalism needs a number of
preconditions, and many of them did not
exist in the republics from 1925 to 1988.
The main reason nationalism did not
occur during the Soviet era is due to the
fact that Stalin did his utmost to destroy
it and worked to replace it with an all-
encompassing, uniting, Soviet national-
ism.
Stalin understood that national-
ism needed a religion, a language, elites,
customs, and an identity with a home-
land in order to emerge or continue, and
through his policies in the 1930's he sys-
tematically eliminated each precondition.
He banned religion and closed churches
and mosques; he destroyed languages by
imposing the language of one group over
that of another; he separated people from
their homeland by deportation, collec-
tivization, or execution. (Hosking 238-
55)
As Stalin destroyed, however,
he also built, and his new institutions
and programs further undermined indi-
vidual group identity by creating Soviet
nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist doc-
trine claimed that separate group nation-
alism was the enemy, since it was bour-
geosie and linked to capitalism.
(Bescancon 16) National differences
were now subordinate to class differ-
ences, and the Soviet system created a
"new socialist person" who was not
motivated by patriotic attachments to a
nation-state, but to the membership in an
"international community of soviet peo-
The main reason nation-
alism did not occur dur-
ing the Soviet era is due
to the fact that Stalin did
his utmost to destroy it





If it is true, however, that
nationalism could not have materialized
during the Stalin era, how did it emerge
under Gorbachev? The paradoxical
answer lies in Stalin's and his successor's
policies. As they destroyed nationalism
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with one hand, they accidentally built it
with the other. Their programs created
native elites, an intelligentsia, and a liter-
ate people united by one language who
associated themselves with a particular
territory. Therefore, since these charac-
teristics are the earlier mentioned prereq-
uisites for nationalism, it is not surpris-
ing that nationalist sentiment could put
down its roots. It is important to note
briefly that in general Stalin's predeces-
Under Gobachev 's prede-
cessors, the republics
desired their own culture,
but that did not mean
that they wanted to sever
their ties with the Soviet
Union itself; this desire
only developed under
Gorbachev.
sors' policies furthered cultural ethnicity
and strengthened the republics' founda-
tion which later enabled them to seek
their independence in the late 1980's.
The evidence from the preced-
ing paragraphs shows that nationalism
had taken root during the Stalin era and
then continued to grow under his succes-
sors. Yet, an important difference must
be made between ethnic consciousness
and ethnic nationalism. It is one thing
for a group to want its own language
and culture, and quite andother for it to
want independence in the form of a
nation-state. Under Gorbachev's prede-
cessors, the republics desired their own
culture, but that did not mean they want-
ed to sever their ties with the Soviet
Union itself; this desire only emerged
under Gorbachev. Certain events and
policies occurred during 19X5-1990 that
catalysed this ethnic consciousness and
turned it into nationalism.
Gorbachev's policies under per-
estroika helped create nationalism in a
number of ways. Glasnost, the policy
which allowed for a greater degree of
free speech and sought to uncover the
the truth about the past, revolutionized
the country and helped lead the
republics towards independence. First,
by calling attention to past and present
problems, Gorbachev showed that the
Party was not perfect and that the history
of the Soviet Union was not entirely glo-
rious. (Goble 3) Many people had no
idea that such horrible atrocities had
occured, and Gorbachev's disclosure
angered the population and accentuated
national conflicts and differences. Due to
glasnost, people were able to debate, to
express national sentiment, and to air
their grievances; they could even hold
demonstrations without the former fear
of punishment. (White 143) Along with
glasnost, Gorbachev's refusal to use force
as a method of control allowed people a
mental and physical freedom that they
had never known.
Secondly, Gorbachev's policy of
the devolution of power from the center
to the republics also fostered national-
ism. Formerly, leaders of the republics
took their orders and received their legit-
imacy from Moscow since the center had
the power to appoint and dismiss offi-
cials. Gorbachev, however, changed the
balance of power when he decided that
people ought to be involved in politics.
Once people were given the right to vote,
leaders of the republics suddenly found
themselves responsible to their con-
stituents, not to Moscow. In order to
gain legitimacy the party secretaries
found themselves championing their
own regional interests instead of those of
the Soviet Union. Lastly, the new eco-
nomic policy of khozrashchet, or self-
financing, which stated that each repub-
lic should pay its own way, created a
feeling of independence, separateness,
and autonomy.
Gorbachev's new policies alone,
however, probably would not have
transformed ethnic consciousness into
nationalism. However, the ideological
break up of the Communist Party along
with the further economic decline
cemented the fate of the Union and
pushed the Republics towards freedom.
All people need to believe in
something whether it is a god, a goal, or
a mission. Early empires were bound
together by Christianity, and people of
different groups submitted to their ruler
because he had been appointed by God.
Although the USSR claimed to be an
atheist country, in a sense it had its own
religion. It replaced God with an ideal -
Communism. All people should submit
not to a king or to a god, but to this
bright and shining vision. Moreover,
Communism created its own "gods" by
forming cults around their leaders - espe-
cially Lenin. Marxist-Leninist ideology
and the Communist Party were the glue
that held the supranational union togeth-
er. (Sakawa259) Once the Party fell and
its ideology was discredited, the disillu-
sioned republics searched for an alterna-
tive and found their replacements within
themselves.
The economic and political situ-
ation in the country also propelled the
republics towards nationalism. As "per-
estroika staggered from crisis to crisis"
and as the economic situation worsened,
some republics began to think that they
would be better off on their own. (Sakwa
265) Moreover, as people learned more
about the environment and uncovered
the wasteful and destructive policies of
the USSR, they wanted to protect their
land from further harm. This, of course,
meant that republics wanted more auton-
omy. The republics had been moving in
that direction ever since the earlier men-
tioned policies of khozrashchet and pop-
ular voting, and these additional inade-
quacies of the state only strengthened
their rebellious feelings.
Lastly, one other factor that cre-
ated nationalism at this time was the
"domino effect." (Bowker) As countries
in Eastern Europe gained real indepen-
dence from Moscow in 1989, the Baltic
republics began to agitate for freedom.
As the Baltics sought independence, the
Ukraine and Byelorussia and the
republics in the Caucasus became inter-
ested as well. (Brzezinski 4) Finally, as
these republics moved towards autono-
my, the remaining republics joined them.
Thus, when the Baltic Republics, who
had always been nationalistic because
they had not been incorporated into the
Due to Glasnost, people
were able to debate, to
express national senti-
ment, and to air their
greivances; they could
even hold demonstrations
without the former fear of
punishment.
Soviet Union until World War II and had
formerly been independent, autonomous
states, grabbed at the chance for indepen-
dence which Gorbachev's policies
offered, they created a precedent which
other republics decided to follow.
In conclusion, nationalism
emerged under Gorbachev for four rea-
sons. The preconditions needed to spark
the movement were in place. Secondly,
Marxist-Leninist ideology, the glue hold-
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of these problems, the economic situation
worsened and many republics began to
think that they would do better fending
for themselves. Lastly, once one republic
obtained self-rule, other republics began
to consider the idea, and nationalism
simply spread. Nationalism was not as
The ideological break up
of the Communist Party
along with further eco-
nomic decline cemented
the fate of the Union and
pushed the Republics
towards freedom.
strong in all republics, nor was autono-
my always desired at first, but as other
republics left the Union, pressure mount-
ed on those who remained. In the end, it
is also important to remember that the
Soviet Union was not doomed to break
apart when Gorbachev came to office.
The end of the Empire was the result of a
combination of its history and
Gorbachev's policies. Nationalism could
not have emerged without both of these
factors. •
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Fairness
continued from page 26
"Why should anyone be upset I
about being fair?" CNN's Larry King!
said. "It forced us to deal with communi-1
ty issues and began out of a great need;!
when for a long time black issues!
weren't brought up in Montgomery, I
Alabama; Catholic parishes in New!
Orleans never (heard] a show in which
someone [favored] birth control" (Los\
CNN's Larry King-
"Why should anyone be
upset about being fair?"
Angeles Times). The doctrine will pro-1
mote accuracy and diversity in report-
ing, not restrict the parameters of robust
public debate.
A STEP TOWARDS CHANGE
The campaign financing bill|
passed by the House on November 22,
1993 included one of the doctrine's pro-
visions of guaranteeing equal campaign
time by providing candidates vouchers
to buy advertising time. This marked a
significant step towards the reenactment
of the doctrine. Still, the reenactment of
the Fairness Doctrine is a delicate issue
that must be approached with caution.
The public needs to discard its fear of an I
omnipotent "Big Brother" government
and realize that their right to informa-
tion is being nibbled away by the very
symbol of free speech. Hopefully, the
bipartisan effort will break fetters on the
long-awaited compromise that free
speech goes hand in hand with govern-
ment regulation. |
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